

## **DDR Roadmap for Southern Sudan**

**By**

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### **Background**

1. As part of the CPA's security arrangement requirements, DDR has commenced across Sudan in 2009. It remains one of the most successful areas of CPA implementation even though it is facing numerous challenges. It is well understood that DDR commenced with targeting the Special Need Groups in Southern Sudan as the first phase of the program and that the larger numbers will be identified after the culmination of the interim period. This phase 2 of DDR should include the access number of fit SPLA soldiers, but should also include consideration of the SSPS and the future of the JIU's. No future vision would be complete if these elements are not considered.
2. It is therefore an opportune moment to take a serious look at our national strategic plan and to review the process as it stands at present. What works well and what does not? Are we going to follow a similar process with the larger group than what we have completed by the end of 2010? Can we do it better, or for the benefit of the transformation in both SPLA, SSPS and the JIU's, can it not be done faster?

### **Current Scenario and Thinking in Southern Sudan**

3. The Problem. The GoSS and especially SPLA is asking the question whether we (the partnership between SSDDRC, IUNDDRU and contributing international donors) cannot improve the service we deliver to the ex-combatants and why can we not do it faster? There is a general sense that DDR is taking much too long. There are various reasons why the program is slow, the most important being the lack of development and opportunities in the Southern Sudan, but is this still an acceptable answer? Also, SPLA needs to improve its sharing of information and preparation of candidates identified for DDR while we should consider ways to improve our service to the individuals. In this regard we could think of preparing them much better for the future through some literacy training and civic education. DDR is already an expensive program so whatever we do, we should consider clever ways of improving what we are delivering within the limitations of financial boundaries we are facing.

4. SPLA Position. SPLA Command is of opinion that we should not expect of them to “carry” the identified candidates until such a time as we are ready for demobilization. It is costing the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) a fortune and if the SPLA fail to proceed fast enough with their internal right sizing and transformation which is also an important requirement for the GOSS. While understanding that we will probably not be able to change the process immediately for the special need groups, we should certainly consider the creation of some capacity to accept larger numbers while also improving the service provided to the ex-combatants.
  
5. Southern Sudan Police Service (SSPS) Requirements. The SSPS has already commenced with the recruitment of an eventual number of 15,000 new recruits. All of us are in agreement that SSPS is on the right path by improving the quality of their members that would allow them to transform into an effective Police. SSDDRC has invited the ministry to commence with discussions and progress is slow, but the need is a high priority and very real. We will have to make a contribution to this effort through the DDR program.
  
6. The JIU's. The JIU's have not been addressed at all, but it is clear that they have not developed into what was envisaged for them in the CPA security arrangements. This statement may be debated, but it is already safe to say that they will not form the core of a new army in a unified Sudan, neither will they form the nucleus of separate armies in the event of separation (not for SAF or SPLA). They would therefore have to be dissolved in any future scenario, remembering that this is a force of close to 34,000 people. As far as SPLA is concerned, the JIU component is a division on its own and one may assume that many of these members will be welcomed back into proper SPLA rank and file when the JIU's are dissolved. Suffice to say that the SPLA members of the JIU's should be considered for DDR in the same way that the rest of the SPLA is being considered. It is not that easy with the SAF members of the JIU's. Referring to the SAF members of the JIU in Southern Sudan only, it must be understood that the vast majority of them are Southerners in any event and would probably like to remain within Southern Sudan in the future. That implies some solution towards the closure of their units and discharge from SAF. Even though they are SAF members, the national strategic plan clearly allocates the responsibility to the relevant regional commission (SSDDRC) to manage their demobilization. Such a solution will imply a few thousand members to be included in the program.
  
7. Eligibility Verification. The best possible verification mechanism is being developed and agreed at the moment. The crux of the matter is that eligibility will be verified against SPLA pay-roll. That will confirm that we are demobilizing the right people. This system will be in place very shortly and should apply into the future.
  
8. WAAF. An important issue remaining to resolve immediately is the matter of the WAAF. A weak point of this program is the poor definition of WAAF. As it stands now, most women in Southern Sudan may feel that they have contributed in one way or the other and therefore regard themselves as WAAF who should be eligible for DDR program's benefit. On the other hand, these candidates cannot be verified from any SPLA list for eligibility because it has never existed. They are also not included on the SPLA pay-roll. SPLA is therefore understandably reluctant to try and identify these candidates. The role of these women

must be recognized but how should one attempt to identify the individuals to benefit from this program? The question could be asked whether an independent community based program to benefit women exclusively and not through a DDR program would not be a better approach?

9. Weapons Verification. The SPLA has already indicated their complete willingness to collaborate with the international community through the SSDDRC on the development for a solution to this challenge. The challenge is that they do not have such a formal system or safekeeping facilities at the moment – a position well known to the bilateral support partners. The expected requirements from the side of the DDR partners are thus impossible to meet. SPLA understands very well that arms stockpile management and safe storage is an important requirement for the future army, but with funding challenges, it will take time to produce. Are we then of the opinion that DDR must be stopped until such time as the funding for these facilities and management training is in place, or are we willing to consider the current realities and find a reasonable solution to suit the most important requirements in the meantime? SPLA is clearly willing to respond to the need to demonstrate how they have managed the disarmed weapons within their current capacity to do so. The number of weapons in free circulation is not only a concern of the international community, but also of the Government of Southern Sudan, hence our ongoing operations to disarm the population in a peaceful way without international support. The risk of a practical solution considering current limitations is acceptable to the Government and the SPLA and while we would be willing to continue to work on possible jointly acceptable solutions, it is of critical importance that this issue should not hold the rest of the program hostage.
  
10. Numbers. The agreed number for demobilization in Southern Sudan is a total of 90,000 candidates. It is too early to indicate whether this is sufficient, or too much. Realizing very well the cost implications and agreeing to ensure that we demobilize only the right candidates, this answer can only be truly reflected after due consideration to the future of the SPLA, SSPS and the JIU's.
  
11. Reintegration: We will need to discuss this next level of the DDR program in Southern Sudan. This is important since Southern Sudan's economy is basically a subsistence economy. Carrying out a traditional DDR method in such an economic system can actually breed problems than solutions. All stakeholders should be able to debate this issue in order to arrive at an acceptable program's outcome.

### **Possible Options**

12. Based on the above, the following options should be considered in more detail:
  - a. Resolve the issues identified through the assessment mission and resume with DDR of the SNG's at the earliest moment.

- b. Continue throughout 2010 with the completion of the SNG caseload in the way our current operational procedures prescribes.
- c. At the same time, commence as soon as possible with considering the future DDR roadmap to ensure that we are jointly agreed and adequately prepared for what DDR must deliver during the future phase.
- d. Consider the establishment of three static DDR transit camps in Southern Sudan from which point all DDR activities are implemented while the quality of the program delivered to the individual candidate is improved. The following may be some ideas:
  - i. Transit camps are established under the control of SSDDRC, but SPLA assist through providing camp command and control staff.
  - ii. Support will be required for these camps, but we may benefit from the existing camps used by returning refugees. These camps are not in frequent use any longer and may suit the DDR requirement well.
  - iii. SPLA salaries and food rations, or at least a portion thereof, continues to be provided to the individual during this period. Alternatively, the financial deduction could be made and transferred from SPLA to SSDDRC. In such an event, SSDDRC will require international financial and logistical management support.
  - iv. The duration of encampment is extended to include critical sensitization, literacy training, psychological treatment and civic education – all of which are already part of the initial reintegration package on offer at the moment.
  - v. Regular leave intervals for candidates to return home and visit their communities as preparation for the final return.
  - vi. Final consultations are completed and individual scheduling of candidates to attend their reintegration training at the location of the implementing partners is finalized.
  - vii. Once the candidate completes his/her reintegration training, they return to the camp one final time to “check-out” and formally return to their original communities/homes.
  - viii. Encampment should not extend beyond about four months, but this must be investigated.
- e. Consider the SSPS requirements for DDR, understanding well that all forms of verification will apply as much to SSPS as to the SPLA.
- f. Commence discussions and sensitization programs with the JIU's to determine the impact they will have on future DDR.
- g. Determine the future of WAAF. While proposing that they warrant their own program, it may be a reality that funding would not be available for such an option. In such an event, we should consider a process through which local authorities identify potential WAAF and submit the identified lists. Special SSDDRC and partners teams should then first visit and verify the authenticity of these candidates before they are allowed access to the program. To achieve such a result, the definition of WAAF must be

revised with specific guidelines to local authorities on how to perform this duty. We should be very cautious not create wrong expectations with most women in Southern Sudan.

13. Impact of the Elections and Referendum. Over and above all the DDR requirements and implications, we should also very soon take a joint position on how we will proceed during the elections and the referendum periods. We should consult with the SPLA and agree on whether we will continue throughout, or whether we should stop for certain periods. More importantly, assuming that we may have candidates being processed at the time, how do we ensure that they are able to vote? We should be in contact with NEC and our internal representatives to understand well what is possible and what not. DDR must not create an opportunity for any party to claim that we have prevented their candidates to vote for them.

### **Recommendation**

It is clear that we are faced with serious issues. These issues must be resolved to ensure that we are ready for 2011 and beyond. It is also clear that SSDDRC, SPLA and GoSS in general cannot take these decisions in isolation – we have to engage with the IUNDDRU and the international donor community. I am therefore recommending that we establish working level joint groups to pursue these solutions in a way that will suit us all at the technical level. This work should commence immediately. In my view the end result should be a type of Round Table focusing on Southern Sudan DDR towards August or September 2010 where our principals could come together to agree on what we have jointly developed.